Ambiguity: A Clear Choice for America in the Taiwan Strait
By jbcobb | May 12, 2010
ABSTRACT
American recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate political body for all Chinese, to include Taiwan, changed the outlook of Taiwan’s future. The Republic of China’s strongest ally’s desire to normalize relations with its decades-long adversary mandated changes in diplomatic language, and forced the U.S. and Taiwan to reconstruct policy for the defense of the island. The new American policy was one of “strategic ambiguity”, a course designed to decrease tensions in the region, recognize the emerging power of China, and to provide defensive arms to Taiwan, with no firm commitment to either side regarding a threshold for intervention. The present paradigm is one which should be maintained with vigilance by the United States, in order to avoid direct superpower military confrontation, international trade disruptions, and prolonged civil strife on Taiwan.
INTRODUCTION
The United States of America has employed a complex and ambiguous foreign policy toward Taiwan from the time of America’s official recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. Since that time, the U.S. has neither openly called for independence for Taiwan, nor admitted a real desire for their unification with the mainland communist People’s Republic of China. This has happened within the context of the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of China as the sole challenge to American hegemony. Even as Taiwan’s economy boomed under a real democracy once martial law was officially lifted in 1987, it has been dwarfed by the meteoric growth of the mainland’s economy under market reforms begun by Deng Xiaoping. American policy has been torn among aspirations for a democratic transformation of Southeast Asia, fears of an antagonistic equal, or superior, in the East, and the reality that China’s emerging market and potential industrial might is vital to American business. The intricacy and importance of the relationship is effectively laid out by two former officials of the Clinton Administration:
Washington’s official relationship with Beijing on the one hand and its unofficial relationship with Taipei on the other represent perhaps the most complex foreign policy balancing act in the world today. At stake are a number of core U.S. foreign policy goals: the promotion of democracy, the preservation of U.S. credibility, loyalty to traditional allies and friends, the engagement and integration of an emerging power into the international system, and the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia as a whole (Campbell & Mitchell, 2001, p. 14).
In reality, America has negotiated the very narrow straits regarding the “two Chinas” since 1945, when the Japanese government surrendered Taiwan to the Allied Forces following the defeat and surrender of Imperial Japan in World War II, and the end of the second Sino-Japanese War. Presidents have struggled to put together a coherent strategy to alleviate Chinese fears and maintain American interests in the region. Andrew Kennedy quotes one Chinese analyst in Beijing as believing that the American government was “unsure of what it had at stake” and that “the U.S. has a policy, but not a strategy, toward Taiwan” (2007, p. 278).
This paper will attempt to analyze the actions of the United States of America toward the island of Taiwan over the last eighteen years, and decipher possible trends in the policies of the administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barak Obama. During the almost five decades preceding these administrations, American policy had moved dramatically away from full support of the Republic of China and denigration of the People’s Republic of China, which was once required of all American politicians during the heady days of the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s. Following America’s official recognition of Communist China in 1979, U.S. executives watched China’s economy expand rapidly, and witnessed the modernization and strengthening of the country’s military forces. American policies have reflected the respect demanded by our long-time adversary, and have generally tended toward less direct confrontation with mainland China.
A brief history of Taiwanese and American policies regarding independence and the mainland Chinese threat will be stated as a basis of understanding how the present paradigm was created. America’s current policy of strategic ambiguity will then be summarized, in order to explicate America’s tentative approach to the question of independence and the reasons for giving so much deference to the mainland’s “one China” principle. The policies of the last two decades will then be examined and compared to those which preceded them, and analyzed within the context of the increasing integration of the economies of the three major players, and the emergence of China and America as the world’s most powerful states.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The vast majority of articles and proposals concerning America’s relationship with Taiwan are primarily confined to a very limited range of possibilities and projections. America’s agnostic position to Taiwanese sovereignty effectively goes unchallenged, with some limited variations recommending application of more pressure to China on the basis of various human rights issues, calls for a policy of extending the status quo ad infinitum, endorsements of a more conciliatory tone from Taiwan, or the suggestion that America back away from the issue altogether. One particularly penetrating and comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy in the region is by Scott Kastner, assistant professor at the University of Maryland, in his report, “Ambiguity, Economic Interdependence, and the US Strategic Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait” from the Journal of Contemporary China (2006). He analyzed the ambiguous strategic approach of the U.S., the criticisms of the policy, and a made risk assessment of the present and alternative strategies, particularly the possibility of “clear, conditional commitment” to Taiwan’s defense. He concluded that America’s most successful policy, one which would best alleviate the threat of a military confrontation with the People’s Republic and one which would best serve America’s long-term trade policy, would be a continuation of the present agnostic position regarding Taiwan’s defense and its future status.
Kastner may, in fact, be correct. There are no other readily apparent approaches which would neither engender a dangerous confrontation with the mainland, nor lose Taiwan as both a bargaining position and separate trading partner. Realists understand that China is our primary adversary in the power politics game and Taiwan is a significant hedge opposing mainland hegemony in the region, while idealists hope that Taiwan’s autonomy will assist in the germination of democracy, freedom, and truly open markets on the mainland. From either perspective, the only viable American option is to shun assured retaliation, or even clear conditional commitment, but remain Taiwan’s closest ally and trading partner with an undisclosed security policy.
HISTORY
At the conclusion of World War II, there was no controlling government in either China or Taiwan. Mainland China was still in the midst of an almost two decades of civil war between the Chinese Nationalists, or Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist Party of China, led by Mao Zedong. Taiwan, which had been under Japanese occupation since 1895, when they defeated the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War, was now liberated from foreign occupation, but had never been a stable independent government for a significant period of time. An interesting historical note is that Imperial China possessed Taiwan for only eight years prior to their defeat by the Japanese.
After the Japanese surrender, there was no government with absolute control of mainland China, so the Allies made the decision to recognize Chiang’s Nationalist Party as the true China, due to concerns of the implications of a large revolutionary communist country in a fragile post-war Asia. Chiang had earlier been assured that Formosa would belong to China at the end of the war (Anonymous, 1943). The Taiwanese people had immediate problems with the provincial government created by the mainland nationalists, and martial law was instituted in 1947. Problems only grew worse with the defeat of the Kuomintang by Mao’s communists in 1949, and the infiltration of the island with thousands of Chinese Nationalists seeking exile.
The Chinese Nationalists employed extreme violence and threat of violence to retain control of the island of Taiwan until 1989, when the government was liberalized and opposition political parties were allowed to form. During the period of martial law, known as the “White Terror”, a large percentage of the Taiwanese population regarded themselves as a nation apart from China and desired independence, both from mainland China and the occupying forces of the Kuomintang. In fact, many residents of the island felt a greater affinity toward the previous occupation of Japan than the “local” liberators unto which they were delivered. Interestingly, the residents of Taiwan still hold sacred remembrances of the “228” incident, which brought martial law, as at least 10,000 local Taiwanese were killed by the occupying Kuomintang government, following an uprising which began with the killing of a female cigarette smuggler by a policeman (Durdin, 1947).
It is possible that the first and most egregious error in diplomacy by the United States of America was the four decades of support of the Kuomintang-led Republic of China, as it was a foreign occupying force, and one that deprived the original, and declared, inhabitants of the island any semblance of self-determination or basic political rights. However, the West was willing to support the Nationalists, in order to deny any legitimacy to the Mao-led People’s Republic of China.
Once liberalization of the Republic of China’s policies allowed true political participation by non-Kuomintang political parties in 1991, the full extent of the discontent of the Taiwanese people became evident, and the American diplomatic approach to the Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China became more complicated and hazardous. The United States was no longer attempting to triangulate a complicated foreign policy with two fairly politically monolithic states divided by one hundred miles of water, but trying to advance agreeable economic and national security stances which had to be filtered through a more economically open, but still distrusting, communist mainland Chinese government, and a new multi-polar Taiwanese populace struggling to find its place in international politics.
The U.S. and Taiwan’s political relationship has been defined, primarily, by three sets of agreements: the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the “Three Joint Communiqués”, and the Taiwan Relations Act. The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by American and Taiwanese leaders in 1954, and guaranteed mutual “military support” if hostilities were to break out in the region. This treaty was cancelled by President Jimmy Carter, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. The Mutual Defense Treaty was replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, and established quasi-diplomatic relations with Taiwanese authorities, ostensibly treating Taiwan as any other state or government. Additionally, the Act provided for the sale of “arms of defensive character” to Taiwan. The three joint communiqués between the United States and the People’s Republic were penned to govern the political and economic relationship between the U.S. and China. The Shanghai Communiqué was signed in 1972, following visits to China by President Richard M. Nixon, in which the United States formally acknowledged the desire of all Chinese for an “undivided China”. The second communiqué was signed in 1979, and was the basis for the formal recognition, by America, of the PRC as the sole legal Chinese government, which ended official political relations with the Republic of China. The third communiqué, signed in 1982, reaffirmed all sections of the first two agreements, and included a declaration, by the United States, for future decreases in arms sales to Taiwan.
AMBIGUITY
Strategic ambiguity is a position taken by all recent American administrations, which: 1) recognizes the “one China” policy supported by the PRC, 2) continues unofficial relations with the Taipei government, 3) allows the sale of defensive arms to Taiwan, 4) makes no clear guarantees regarding the American response to an offensive act against Taiwan, and 5) clearly states an American preference for continued interaction and trade, and a commitment to a peaceful resolution by both sides. Strategic ambiguity has existed, de facto, since the official recognition of the PRC in 1979. It has continued to be the primary policy of the US, even though Clinton responded strongly to Chinese exercises in the Strait in 1996, and Bush made statements that alluded to a clear commitment for defense of Taiwan in the event of attack.
The one question that has been answered, or so it seems, is the idea that America tacitly supports attempts by Taiwan to gain independence. America has repeatedly reiterated support of the “one China” policy demanded by the PRC, but has been cautious to state unequivocally that it could not happen. The ambiguous American position regarding Taiwanese independence was summed up by President Ronald Reagan in August of 1982, following the joint U.S.-China communiqué addressing arms sales to Taiwan:
The Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waver from this fundamental position (Reagan, 1982).
No American President has wavered very far from that position since. All statements have remained cautiously agnostic regarding independence, in deference to the People’s Republic of China’s steadfast demand of a “one China” policy for the world.
An additional ambiguity in the trilateral relationship exists between the countries on either side of the Straits. The PRC and the Republic of China sent representatives to Hong Kong to attempt to negotiate resolutions to problems, primarily trade-related, between the two governments in 1992. The outcome of this meeting was less than decisive, as every political faction involved, and uninvolved but concerned entities, drew different conclusions from the results. The significant product of the discussions is what is known as the “One China” principle, which is defined in many ways. The two parties, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits from the mainland and the Straits Exchange Foundation from Taiwan, came to the agreement that Taiwan and mainland China are one country. However, the People’s Republic of China believed they were the legitimate government for that country, as did the ROC. Lee Teng-hui, ROC President, later redefined his understanding of the principle as “one China, separately expressed”, and described the 1992 Consensus as “a consensus without consensus” (Xu, 2001, p.122). The other major party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party, staunch supporters of Taiwanese sovereignty, believe that the talks achieved nothing but the continuation of an agreement to disagree, while they have espoused a “One China, One Taiwan” policy.
CLINTON
Taiwan had much hope that President Clinton would provide them with an opportunity for another openly pro-sovereignty administration. There was much anticipation for some movement on America’s position on the politics of the Straits when the administration conducted a thorough review of its policies toward Taiwan in 1993. The hope stemmed from the fact that Taiwan had made great economic strides since America first formally recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate Chinese government in 1979, and the island nation was now one of the most important industrial locations in the world, and a significant trade partner of the United States. In 1992, there was approximately $40 billion worth of trade between the United States and Taiwan, compared to approximately $33 billion between the PRC and the US (Foreign Trade, 2010). Taiwan’s budding economy was its greatest weapon against PRC control, and it hoped to “create a complex web of economic interdependency with the rest of the world [as] a situational deterrent vis-à-vis China” (Chen, 2002, p. 105).
The Taiwan Policy Review resulted in very little change between the nations. The United States reaffirmed their support of the four foundational documents of the Taiwan relationship and reiterated their refusal to support official visits by representatives of the Republic of China. The changes included visits to Taiwan by “high-level officials from U.S. economic and technical agencies”, a change in the name of the unofficial ROC office in the US, and a promise to “support its membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite” (Lord, 1994).
President Clinton’s determination to defend Taiwan’s interests was tested, beginning in late 1995, in what is known as the “Third Taiwan Straits Crisis”. Chinese leader Jiang Zemin and Communist Party leadership had become increasingly alarmed at ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s seemingly bold moves signaling a renunciation of the “One China” policy. Additionally, China’s distrust of American intentions regarding Taiwan was heightened in May of 1995, when the United States granted President Lee permission to attend a reunion at his alma mater in New York, in contravention of previous agreements. The Chinese government scheduled military exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Straits, probably an attempt to frighten secessionists, although, “some analysts argue that these actions were merely an acceleration of a trend of increasingly aggressive behavior on the part of the PRC against its own citizens and its neighbors” (Dreyer, 1997, p. 33). The military exercises and missile tests ended in March of 1996, with no direct confrontation.
The bold move by the Chinese, if calculated to solidify domestic support for Jiang, scare the citizens of Taiwan away from Lee, and to reveal America as an unreliable ally, was successful on only one count. Jiang probably gained in popular support among hard-line Communist supporters, but Lee and his party won re-election, and President Clinton sent the U.S. Navy into the Taiwan Strait for the first time in decades. It is safe to say that, “China underestimated US resolve to intervene against hard-line Chinese actions” (Tow, 2007, p. 283). This may have been the high-water mark for an American show of military force in support of the defense of Taiwan, as the U.S. and China have tended toward the avoidance of any direct confrontation regarding Taiwan since the incident (Tow, 2007, p. 283).
In summer of 1996, a short three months after the crisis, President Clinton conducted an official visit to China. The Americans went further than expected to salve the wounds of the spring, when Clinton created quite a furor with his “Three No’s” declaration in the Shanghai Library. In a shocking public admission, although one that had been American policy for some time, Clinton said:
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy.
Staunch supporters of an independent or autonomous Taiwan were disenchanted, since the declaration came on the heels of such a vigorous military response a few months before. Pro-Taiwanese furor would soon be flamed again with domestic presidential elections, and a new administration in the U.S.
CHEN
Chen Shui-bian, mayor of Taipei, ran for election as a pro-independence candidate of the Democratic People’s Party in 2000, and promised to clean up the corruption, which he said was rampant in all previous Kuomintang administrations. The election was a hard-fought one, and one in which Chen could only garner little more than a plurality, and less than a plurality for his party in the Legislative Yuan.
Chen was loose cannon from his first day in office. He pushed the idea of sovereignty past the positions of the previous Kuomintang administrations, though they were also seen as serious threats by the mainland. Chen operated from a position of not only maintaining a pro-separatist position for Taiwan, but took a step further and wanted to distance the government from what is seen as many as “mainland” control of the islands by Chinese exiles. Although he came to office with the mantra of cleaning up the corruption that had surely been evident in the Republic of China’s governments under the Nationalists, he took corruption to unprecedented levels. Chen eventually managed to turn even the staunchest Democratic Progressive Party loyalists against him, and his mismanagement of state affairs and unwise outlandish pronouncements assured the return of the Kuomintang Nationalists to power.
Despite Chen’s later implosion, Taiwan was able to make great strides with the newly elected George W. Bush administration in the first couple of years. According to Dittmer,
in the first 18 months, the Bush administration disavowed Clinton’s “three nos,” allowed officials on both sides to visit each other’s buildings and fly their national flags, and allowed Taiwan’s leaders to conduct longer transit visits (including speeches!) on US territory (Dittmer, 2008, p.32)
George W. Bush certainly appeared to be making a tack toward supporting sovereignty, something which had not been done openly by an American President for many decades. In addition, American and Taiwanese militaries began a regime of more active cooperation. This newfound American loyalty to Taiwan, according to Dittmer, can be attributed to “the anticommunist ideological affinity between Chen and Bush” (Dittmer, 2008, p.33). Unfortunately, Chen lost control of his country, and was ultimately convicted, along with members of his family, of corruption and money laundering (CNN, 2009).
BUSH
The election of George W. Bush as America’s 43rd President signaled renewed optimism for pro-independence factions, and at the time, it was even stated by analysts, “Some in Taiwan, and certainly the Taiwan lobby in Washington, believe that the Bush Administration represents the best chance to improve U.S.-Taiwan relations since Ronald Reagan became president in 1981 (Lampton, 2002). Bush’s rhetoric and actions would not belie this optimism, and two years into his administration, Dennis Hickey said that, “It is a fact that the George W. Bush administration has carried out the most significant rebalancing of US policy in the US-People’s Republic of China (PRC)-Taiwan triangular relationship since Richard Nixon went to China in 1972” (Hickey, 2007, pp. 111-112).
A significant international incident took place in April 2001, involving the collision of an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft with a Chinese F-8 jet over the South China Sea, approximately 70 miles from Hainan Island (Kan et al., 2001, p. 1). The Chinese fighter pilot was presumably killed during the incident, and the American reconnaissance plane suffered sufficient damage to require an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. The American crew was detained for 11 days, and though subjected to interrogation, were not treated poorly (Kan et al., 2001). The aircraft was disassembled by the Chinese for intelligence purposes, but was eventually returned to America. The mishap led to a short-term heightening of tensions between the participants, but soon subsided.
However, President Bush continued to tout a tough line regarding China’s growing military threat in the region, and agreed to larger military sales to Taiwan than had occurred during the Clinton Administration. Moreover, Bush’s challenge to the People’s Republic of China was to become a “responsible stakeholder”, as originally defined by his Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005). The Bush administration laid out a list of concerns they thought the PRC should address, including the proliferation of weapons, the military buildup, trade imbalances, and even intellectual property rights. While the administration was taking a tough line toward China, and even included a peaceful resolution to Taiwan as part of the “responsible stakeholder” status, Bush’s people were laying groundwork for greater future cooperation, and began to emphasize the administration’s adherence to the “One China” policy.
The new American strategy of closer ties with Taiwan, and silence regarding the new government’s support of absolute sovereignty, was rather short-lived. The Bush Administration sought to patch problems with the mainland, and seemingly could not allow a changed position on Taiwan to spoil the work. The breaking apart of closer ties with Taiwan was made much easier by the erratic and corrupt behavior of President Chen, who was openly rebuffed by President Bush on several occasions. The Bush Administration began to distance itself from Taiwan in late 2003, shortly after Chen proposed legal changes allowing democratic referenda on rather controversial issues, which was considered a threat to the status quo by China. For the Americans, this was possibly one too many provocative moves from Chen. However, the political posturing was only part of the equation, as Ted Galen Carpenter, of the Cato Institute explains:
The Bush administration believes that the United States needs China’s help on an array of important issues. U.S. officials desire Beijing’s assistance against Islamic radical groups, but the need for China’s cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue is probably the most important factor (Carpenter, 2004).
The Bush Administration fully realized that China’s assistance would require quid pro quo, and that “a change in U.S. policy on Taiwan appears to be the price that Chinese officials are demanding” (Carpenter, 2004, p.).
OBAMA
During his candidacy for the presidency of the United States, Barak Obama repeatedly maintained that he would continue to provide defensive weaponry to the Taiwanese government, and intonated that he would maintain America’s agnostic position regarding independence. Furthermore, he hinted that he would place greater emphasis on China, Taiwan, and the entire Asian region, which he said was neglected during the Bush administration.
The Obama administration ruffled Chinese feathers, at least publicly, with an agreement for the sale of Patriot missiles and Blackhawk helicopters, although deferring, not denying, the future sale of F-16 fighter planes to the Taipei government (BBC, 2010). The sale followed on the heels of a six-billion dollar arms agreement between Taiwan and the previous Bush administration, which prompted a snarky short-term breaking of military ties between China and the United States. Although the mainland was unhappy with the arms deal, as they disapprove of all sales, it is possible that the delay of the fighter replacements is a conciliatory move to China.
In addition to the arms furor, Obama has enjoyed little success in his attempts to bend Chinese policy on trade and has received little support from them on vital stand-offs with Iran and North Korea. But, there seems to be little happiness across the Strait in Obama’s early years, as President Ma is disgruntled with the lack of response regarding the repeated requests for newer variants of the F-16 fighter.
At this point and time, it appears as if all sides have come to an understanding that unification of PRC and Taiwan will take place, but the timeframe is in question. President Ma has been criticized by his own populace because of his cozy relationship with Beijing. He has tried sidestepping the issue by hinting that unification is possible in the future, but not now.
CONCLUSION
America has very limited options regarding the status of Taiwan. Long ago, America backed away from supporting sovereignty for the island, and a switch in that policy at this point, when even the leadership of the Republic of China acknowledges unification is a possibility in the future, is impossible. The continuation of arms sales, in spite of the PRC’s blustering, is a moral necessity, given our many promises to Taiwan on that subject, and should continue until the people of Taiwan themselves no longer feel the necessity to defend themselves from Chinese invasion or attack. The only question on the table is whether or not America should fully commit itself to repelling a Chinese assault on the island.
Kastner’s policy of strategic ambiguity, leaving the PRC to ponder our response, and stifling aggressive secessionist moves by Taiwan, seems to be America’s best course. Even though Bush granted a clear commitment to Taiwan’s defense early in his presidency, it was not repeated, and even he recognized the advantage of not showing your hand. Additional advantages to this policy is that it would probably promote a continuation of the status quo into the foreseeable future, as none of the players want to make a provocative move under the present paradigm. The status quo allows America to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in particularly difficult negotiations with the PRC, and could prove useful in some future impasse.
Finally, as long as America can assist in the maintenance of the present situation, the PRC and Taiwan may eventually settle this bilaterally. The present Taiwanese administration is the most PRC-friendly in history, and China is receptive to the idea of a greater trade relationship with Taiwan. Additionally, given closer economic ties and much greater trade volume between China and Taiwan, the PRC may be conflicted about its primary goal regarding the island. Since Deng Xiaoping’s success in awakening the economic potential of the nation, achieving primacy in trade and industry has overshadowed the ongoing effort to modernize the People’s Liberation Army. Scott Kastner explains the dilemma faced by the Chinese:
Beijing is itself ambiguous about Taiwan: it won’t, for example, reveal a specific ‘red line’ which would trigger a military response, other than to say legal independence is too far. Pushing the issue would force Chinese leaders to reckon with a dilemma that they would prefer to avoid confronting directly, meaning they are unlikely to force Washington to reveal its bottom line by initiating crisis (Kastner, 2006, p. 669).
Strategic ambiguity, closer ties among all three countries, and an increasing volume of trade between them is the solution to deterrence of future crises in the Strait.
REFERENCES
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Campbell, K.M. & Mitchell, D.J. (2001). Crisis in the Taiwan Strait? Foreign Affairs, 80(4)., 14-25.
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Dittmer, L. (2008). Bush, China, Taiwan: A triangular analysis. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 10(2) 21-42.
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Kan, S.A., Best, R., Bolkcom, C., Chapman, R., Cronin, R., Dumbaugh, K., et al. (2001). China-U.S. aircraft collision incident of April 2001: Assessments and policy implications. Retrieved May 5, 2010 from the Federation of American Scientists website:
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Kastner, S.L. (2006). Ambiguity, economic interdependence, and the US strategic dilemma in the Taiwan Strait. Journal of Contemporary China, 15(49), 651-669.
Kennedy, A.B. (2007). China’s perceptions of U.S. intentions toward Taiwan. Asian Survey, 47(2), 268–287.
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Xu S. (2001). The 1992 consensus: A review and assessment of consultations between the association for relations across the Taiwan Strait and the straits exchange foundation. American Foreign Policy Interests, 23(3), 121-140.
Zoellick, R.B. (2005). Whither China: from membership to responsibility? Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Retrieved April 28, 2010, from National Committee on United States – China Relations website: http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf
Topics: Foreign Policy, International Relations, Diplomacy, and Wars | No Comments »
Barak Hussein Gump
By jbcobb | March 9, 2010
Barak Obama’s ignorance regarding insurance is astounding. Did anybody hear his remarks comparing his automobile insurance in Illinois to the state of health insurance in America? Surely, if any of you were paying attention, you would have thrown something at your radio or television while spewing obscenities.
BHO explained how his auto insurance in Illinois wasn’t “real insurance”, and that the company laughed at him when he asked them to repair his car, following an accident. He continued to explain that the insurance was only set up to meet minimum state guidelines. Well, duh, Albert Einstein Obama somehow fails to understand the difference between liability insurance and full coverage, or he makes the false assumption that the average citizen fails to grasp the difference. Given the past mistakes of this idiot, I am inclined to the former. We thought W was the epitome of Oval Office ignorance. Comapred to Barak Gump, Bush is a super-genius.
JB
Topics: Big Brother, Communism, Fascism, Socialism, and the Battle for American Liberty, Congress and Legislation, Domestic Policy and Social Programs, Society, Cultural Issues, and Miscellaneous, The White House | No Comments »
Happy Birthday, Mr. Libertarian by Jeff Riggenbach
By jbcobb | March 2, 2010
Today — March 2nd — is Murray Rothbard’s birthday. Had he lived, he’d be 84 years old today. And there’s sadness in that, because 84 in the world of today, though still a “ripe old age,” is not really all that old. Lots of people live to be 84. Even libertarians do it. Both Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek lived to be 92. Milton Friedman lived to be 94. Henry Hazlitt lived to be 98. In Radicals for Capitalism, his important 2007 book about the history of the modern American libertarian movement, Brian Doherty centers his story around what he describes as “[f]ive thinkers … without whom there would have been no uniquely libertarian ideas or libertarian institutions of any popularity or impact in America in the second half of the twentieth century … Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich A. Hayek, Ayn Rand, Murray Rothbard, and Milton Friedman.”
“Four men and one woman,” Doherty writes, “four Jews and one Catholic; four economists and one novelist; four minarchists … and one anarchist … two native-born Americans and three immigrants; two Nobel Prize winners and three who remained not only aloof from most professional and intellectual accolades but generated a heated hostility from cultural gatekeepers.” Doherty makes no mention of it, but there’s yet another facile point of comparison he might have used in discussing his five major figures — their longevity. For of his five major figures, three (Mises, Hayek, and Friedman) lived into their 90s. The other two — Rand and Rothbard — never made it to 80. Rothbard never made it to 70. It’s almost as though radicalism makes you die young. Mises, Hayek, and Friedman were minarchists — classical liberals, to be more precise.
JB: To read the rest of the article posted byB.K. Marcus, or to listen to audio podcast by Mr. Riggenbach, go to the mises.org website, the best site in the world!
Topics: Big Brother, Communism, Fascism, Socialism, and the Battle for American Liberty, Economics, Literature, Society, Cultural Issues, and Miscellaneous | No Comments »